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Abstract 
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will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit 
shifting decreases the tax-base elasticity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing 
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rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. In general 
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1. Introduction 
 
Growing mobility of capital during the last twenty years has fuelled the academic 
and public debate on international capital tax competition. Most of the academic 
work in this field supports the view that competition will drive tax rates below their 
optimal level and that this will become a severe problem as economic integration 
proceeds (see Wilson, 1999, for a survey). Meanwhile, the growing importance of 
foreign direct investment through multinational firms has increased the relevance of a 
new type of capital tax base mobility that arises under separate accounting. By 
shifting profits from one jurisdiction to the other, multinational firms have the 
opportunity to minimize their overall tax payments without affecting any decision on 
real investment. The multinational firm can thus benefit from location advantages in 
one jurisdiction while transferring the economic rent of the investment to the 
jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate. Early empirical studies for the US found that 
tax induced profit shifting is in fact part of multinational firm’s tax minimization 
strategy (for an overview see Hines 1997, 1999) and  these results have recently been 
confirmed by evidence for other OECD countries1.  
 
Against this background, the European Commission (2001) presents a strategy that 
would allow multinational firms to create a consolidated corporate tax base for their 
EU-wide activities. This proposed change from the current system of separate 
accounting to either a “Common Consolidated Base Taxation” or a “Home State 
Taxation” would make profit shifting more difficult or even impossible. These two 
policy alternatives do, however, have a number of shortcomings and their 
implementation faces several difficulties2. It therefore seems to be important to 
evaluate the effects of profit shifting on inter-jurisdictional tax competition in more 
detail before concluding whether this proposal can improve upon the current method 
of separate accounting.  
 
                                                 
1 For example, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) found that tax payments of foreign and domestic 
banks show significantly different reactions on an increase in domestic taxation and interpret their 
results as evidence for profit shifting. Bartelsmann and Beemtsma (2003) identify profit shifting 
activities as a source for productivity mismeasurement and are able to quantify the effect of transfer 
prices on tax revenue. 
2 For an evaluation and comparison of the two concepts see Mintz and Weiner (2003).  
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In the theoretical literature on tax competition with profit shifting, several authors 
stressed that the strategic choice of profit shifting regulations may lead to a double 
taxation of corporate profits and hence higher effective tax rates (Mansori and 
Weichenrieder, 2001, Raimondos-Møller and Scharf, 2002). In opposition, others 
suggest that profit shifting may spur tax competition between governments and exert 
further downward pressure on statutory tax rates (Gordon and McKie-Mason, 1995) 
and on corporate tax credits (Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000). All these papers model 
competition between regions of similar size. In contrast, most profit shifting takes 
place between countries of different size, i.e. between large countries such as 
Germany and small tax heavens like Ireland (see Weichenrieder, 1996). It is therefore 
important to incorporate size asymmetries when evaluating the impact of profit 
shifting. 
  
The literature on asymmetric tax competition goes back to the work of Bucovetsky 
(1991) and Wilson (1991). They show that tax competition between small and large 
jurisdictions with identical relative endowments of capital and labour leads to a Nash 
equilibrium in which tax rates, capital-labour ratios and revenue differ among 
jurisdictions. Their findings lead to an interesting conclusion about “smallness” in tax 
competition. Since there are capital exports from the large to the small jurisdiction in 
equilibrium, residents of the small jurisdiction are better off than residents of the 
large jurisdiction. Although tax competition is harmful for world welfare as a whole, 
Wilson (1991) shows that the small jurisdiction may benefit from tax competition if 
differences between jurisdictions are sufficiently large. Therefore, the small 
jurisdiction is unwilling to harmonize tax rates. 
 
There exist a number of contributions that extend the basic model of asymmetric tax 
competition (see e.g. the survey by Wilson, 1999). Other papers, like Kanbur and 
Keen (1993), readdress the issue of asymmetries to other fields of taxation. However, 
none of the literature on asymmetric tax competition has considered profit shifting so 
far. This is the aim of the present paper where we incorporate competition for 
taxable profits into a framework of asymmetric capital tax competition. Even with 
profit shifting, equilibrium tax rates for the small jurisdiction will be lower than that 
for the large jurisdiction. Our main result is that continuing economic integration, 
modelled as a reduction in the costs of profit shifting, may lead the low-tax (small) 
jurisdiction to increase its tax rate. This implies that tax competition may become 
 3
less severe if the competition for physical capital and paper profits are simultaneously 
allowed for.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out a theoretical model of profit 
shifting between asymmetric jurisdictions. In Section 3 we compare our results with 
that of the basic model where there is no possibility for profit shifting. Based on this 
comparison we conclude how equilibrium tax rates will change with the introduction 
of profit shifting. Possible extensions and shortcomings of the model are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.          
 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1. General Framework 
The model used here starts from the work of Bucovetsky (1991). The world consists 
of two jurisdictions labelled A and B which are identical in all respects except for 
population size. Each jurisdiction has a fixed population which is immobile 
internationally. A representative individual in each jurisdiction inelastically supplies 
one unit of labour and owns k  units of capital. Thus, k  is also the average capital-
labour ratio in the world if we assume that capital is fully employed3. Since capital is 
perfectly mobile among jurisdictions, it is possible that the capital-labour ratio 
employed in each country ik  differs from the world average capital-labour ratio. 
Denoting by is  the exogenous share of country i  on the world’s population such that 
 
1A Bs s+ =            (1) 
 
 the world average capital-labour ratio is given by 
 
A A B Bk s k s k= +           (2) 
 
Both jurisdictions produce a single, homogenous output whose price is normalized to 
unity. The production function is identical for the two jurisdictions and given by 
( )if k . Furthermore, it is concave in its input, twice differentiable and exhibits 
                                                 
3 Of course, this is the case as long as the interest rate on capital r is positive. 
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constant returns to scale such that ( ) 0if k′ >  and ( ) 0if k′′ < . Following Bucovetsky 
(1991), we assume a quadratic specification of the production function, which permits 
us to introduce several convenient simplifications4. Output and factor markets are 
perfectly competitive. 
 
Output in both jurisdictions is produced by one single representative multinational 
firm which operates a subsidiary in each jurisdiction. Both jurisdictions levy a source 
tax at rate it  on each unit of capital employed within its boundaries. With identical 
per capita endowments of capital, identical production technologies and identical 
preferences across jurisdictions, differences in tax rates are the only possible reason 
for capital flows in equilibrium. For the rest of the paper, and without loss of 
generality, we assume that A Bt t≥ . As a result, there will be capital exports from the 
high tax jurisdiction A to the low tax jurisdiction B.  
 
 
2.2. Firm behaviour 
The representative firm tries to maximize its overall net profits by choosing the 
optimal levels of Ak  and Bk  taking into account the different tax rates and the 
interest rate r, which is endogenously determined and equal across jurisdictions. In 
addition, the firm has an opportunity for profit shifting activities.  
 
To achieve comparable results to the standard model of Bucovetsky (1991), we model 
profit shifting in a way that appears to be very simple: in order to avoid capital taxes 
in the high tax jurisdiction, the firm may underreport the amount of capital 
employed in jurisdiction A to the tax authorities. However, tax authorities in both 
jurisdictions can observe the total amount of capital (which is, by assumption, equal 
to the world population). Consequently, if information on tax payments is revealed in 
the public, e.g. through the balance sheet, a firm that underreports capital in 
jurisdiction A by a certain amount, has to overreport its use of capital in the low tax 
jurisdiction B by the same amount. Otherwise, tax authorities would observe tax 
evasion5. This view of profit shifting captures one central strategy of multinational 
                                                 
4 Relaxing this assumption does not affect our qualitative results in a substantial way. 
5 If information on firm’s tax payments in the foreign jurisdiction is not accessible, one may 
alternatively assume that tax authorities voluntary exchange this information in order to fight tax 
evasion.   
 5
firms when minimizing their overall tax burden - the allocation of debt. If, for 
example, the multinational firm can (partially) deduct its interest payments from the 
tax base, then it will allocate the largest possible share of its debt in the high tax 
jurisdiction. As a consequence, when compared to that of a national firm of equal 
size, the tax base of the multinational will be relatively low in the high tax 
jurisdiction and it will be relatively high in the low tax jurisdiction. Our model 
captures this situation by using the amount of capital declared in each country as a 
proxy for the tax base6.  
 
To limit the extent of profit shifting in our model, from now on also referred to as 
“misreporting”, we assume that these activities involve resource costs to the firm. We 
assume that the total costs of misreporting increase linear with the tax base7 and are 
given by: 
 
( , )θ α β Ak  
 
where the function ( , )θ α β  is defined as: 
 
2( , )
2
βθ α β α=           (3) 
 
The parameter [ ]0,β ∈ ∝  is exogenously given and describes the general costs for 
misreporting activities. This parameter can be related to the degree of globalization 
or to the tax code of the high tax jurisdiction. As can be seen from (3), costs increase 
with β . Accordingly, low values of β  may either depict a situation in which 
                                                 
6 Therefore, this work is in line with other recent theoretical papers that use a similar approach (e.g. 
Mintz and Smart, 2004). Moreover, it is in line with empirical findings, too. As Grubert (2003) points 
out, almost one half of profit shifting is done with financing strategies including debt allocation. 
According to his results, transfer pricing techniques, which are often used in the related literature and 
which require to model a tax on profits, are not that commonly used in practise. 
7 Assuming that the costs of misreporting increase linear in the tax base considerably simplifies our 
analysis. As will be shown below in equation (5), the firm’s choice of α  then will be independent of 
the capital allocation between the two jurisdictions. Alternatively, one could consider the case where 
concealment costs are independent from the amount of capital invested in jurisdiction A. Then, the 
optimal level of misreporting would also depend on Ak . In this case, more capital would be allocated in 
the high tax jurisdiction in order to decrease concealment costs. As will be discussed in section 4, using 
this alternative function does not affect our qualitative results in a substantial way. 
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increased globalization creates generous opportunities for the firm to undertake 
misreporting activities or a situation where there exist a number of loopholes in the 
national tax code that make it rather easy to shift profits. The parameter [0,1]α ∈  is 
defined as the fraction of the tax base that is misreported. We assume that resource 
costs are a convex function of this parameter. This assumption is standard in the 
literature on both tax evasion and profit shifting (e.g. Kant, 1988; Haufler and 
Schjelderup, 2000) and is justified by additional efforts that need to be taken in order 
to conceal the misreporting activity from tax authorities.  
 
With these specifications, the overall net profits of the multinational firm are given 
by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )A B A A B B A B A B A Af k f k t k t k k k r t t k kα θ α β∏ = + − − − + + − −    (4) 
 
The firm maximizes equation (4) by choosing Ak , Bk  and α . In a first step, we derive 
the optimal fraction of Ak  to be misreported by differentiating (4) with respect to α 8:  
 
( ) ( , ) 0 ( , )A B A A A Bt t k k t tα αθ α β θ α β− − = = − −       (5) 
 
Solving for ( , )αθ α β  and rearranging, we get: 
 
A Bt tα β
−=             
 
As can bee seen from (5), misreporting only depends on the difference in tax rates 
between jurisdictions and on the exogenous parameter β . While an increase in At  
will ceteris paribus increase the misreporting activities, an increase in Bt  will decrease 
misreporting. Implicitly differentiating (5), we get: 
 
 1
( , )A
d
dt αα
α
θ α β=  , 
1
( , )B A
d d
dt dtαα
α α
θ α β= − = −       (6) 
 
                                                 
8 Subscripts denote the partial derivative of the concealment cost function with respect to the corresponding 
parameter.  
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In a second step, we derive the allocation of capital between the two jurisdictions by 
differentiation equation (4) with respect to Ak  and Bk . Since the net return to capital 
r  must be equal among jurisdictions, we get: 
 
( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( )A A B B Bf k t t r f k tα α θ α β′ ′− − − − = = −   
 
which simplifies to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( , ) 0A B B Af k f k t t α θ α β′ ′− + − − − =       (7) 
 
For a given tax pair ( At , Bt ), equation (5) and (7) completely determine the allocation 
of capital to the two jurisdictions, and its net return r . Note that, for the case where 
α  is zero, such that there is no misreporting, equation (7) reduces to 
( ) ( )A A B Bf k t r f k t′ ′− = = − . In this case, we are back in the model of asymmetric tax 
competition by Bucovetsky (1991). Introducing misreporting activities now has the 
effect that the differences in the capital-labour ratio between the two jurisdictions are 
smaller. This effect is intuitive as misreporting decreases the effective tax rate the 
firm has to pay in the high tax jurisdiction. This is because the fraction α  of capital 
invested in A is effectively taxed at the lower tax rate of jurisdiction B. Since it is 
not the nominal tax rate it  but the effective tax rate that determines the degree of 
capital flows, this decrease in effective taxation reduces capital outflows from the 
high tax to the low tax jurisdiction. So, with misreporting, real capital mobility is 
partly substituted by “paper” mobility9.  
     
The next step is to determine the effect of changes in the tax rates on the allocation 
of capital: Solving equation (2) for Ak  and Bk , substituting in (7), implicitly 
differentiating and using (5) gives the change in each jurisdiction’s capital-labour 
ratio in response to a national and a foreign tax increase.   
 
(1 )
0
( ) ( )
ji
i i j j i
sdk
dt s f k s f k
α−= <′′ ′′+    }{, ,i j A B∈ ; i j≠     (8a) 
                                                 
9 That is, capital that would be reallocated from one jurisdiction to the other in the absence of 
misreporting opportunities now stays at its origin while the firm still reports an export/import of 
capital to the local tax authorities. In the extreme case where the costs for misreporting are zero and 
hence all capital is reported in the low tax country, there would be no capital flows at all. In this case, 
however, the equilibrium tax rates for both jurisdictions would be the same. 
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(1 )
0
( ) ( )
ji i
j i j j i i
sdk dk
dt s f k s f k dt
α−= − = − >′′ ′′+        (8b) 
 
As can be seen, while an increase in the national tax rate will drive away capital, an 
increase in the foreign tax rate will attract capital and hence increase the capital-
labour ratio. Similar to the basic asymmetric tax competition model, the degree to 
which capital reacts to a change in tax rates crucially depends on the relative size of 
the jurisdiction. While the denominator of equation (8a) and (8b) is a constant that 
is equal for both jurisdictions in the case of a quadratic production function10, the 
numerator is larger for the small country. Consequently, an increase in the tax rate of 
the small jurisdiction will result in a higher outflow of capital. Our results deviate 
from those in the standard model since the reaction of capital with respect to a tax 
change also depends on the parameter α . For positive values of α , the effect of a 
tax change is lower than in the standard model. In relative terms /i idk dt  will be 
lower for both jurisdictions. In absolute terms, the decrease will be stronger for the 
smaller jurisdiction. This result resembles the findings of Mintz and Smart (2004) 
that income shifting tends to make the location of real investment less responsive to 
tax rate differentials.       
 
 
2.3. The government’s problem 
Governments in each jurisdiction set their capital tax rate so to maximize per-capita 
tax revenue. This is consistent with the assumption of a “Leviathan” type 
government or of a welfare maximizing government when the marginal benefit of a 
public good is constant and exceeds marginal welfare from private consumption. 
Since we are dealing here with tax competition, jurisdictions behave non-
cooperatively in setting tax rates. Due to the asymmetry of our model, revenue for 
the two jurisdictions is composed differently. Revenue for the high tax jurisdiction is 
given by: 
 
(1 )A A AR t kα= −           (9a) 
 
Revenue for the low tax jurisdiction is given by: 
                                                 
10 Using equation (1), the denominator in equation (8a) and (8b) simplifies to ′′f .      
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B B B B AR t k t kα= +           (9b) 
 
Differentiating equation (9a) with respect to At , the revenue-maximizing tax rate for 
jurisdiction A, for any tax rate chosen by jurisdiction B, is given by the following 
condition: 
 
( , ) (1 ) (1 ) 0A AA B A A A
A A
dk dF t t k k t
dt dt
αα α = − + − − =        (10a) 
 
When setting its tax rate, the high tax jurisdiction has to consider the following 
effects: first, tax revenue per unit of capital reported in A will change. Second, there 
will be an inflow (outflow) of capital to (from) jurisdiction B. Third, the tax rate 
determines α , which will partly replace real capital flows between A and B with 
flows that only exist on paper. An increase in At  will simultaneously decrease Ak  and 
increase α . As a result, there are two negative effects for the tax base.     
 
The revenue-maximizing value for the low tax jurisdictions tax rate, now depending 
on the tax rate chosen by jurisdiction A, can be obtained by the following condition 
that results from differentiating (9b) with respect to Bt :  
 
( , ) 0B B AA B B A A B
B B B
dk dk dF t t k k k t
dt dt dt
αα α = + + + + =    
 
From equation (6), we know that ( )/ /B Ad dt d dtα α= − . Since we know from equation 
(8a) and (8b) that ( )( )/ / /B B A A A Bdk dt dk dt s s=  and ( )/ /A B A Adk dt dk dt= − , we can 
rewrite the condition for the optimal value of Bt  as: 
 
( , ) ( ) 0B A AA B B A A B
B A A
s dk dF t t k k k t
s dt dt
αα α = + + − − =        (10b) 
 
In contrast to the high tax jurisdiction, an increase in Bt  now has three different 
effects. First, there will be capital outflows that decrease Bk . However, since any 
decrease in Bk  results in an increase in Ak , from which a fraction α  comes back for 
taxation “on paper”, the overall effect for the tax base is weakened. Finally, an 
increase in Bt  will decrease misreporting activities which has an negative impact for 
the tax base. 
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 In the Nash equilibrium, both conditions (10a) and (10b) have to be fulfilled. We 
now want to determine the required condition for the existence of this Nash 
equilibrium. Since ( , ) 0A A BF t t =  and ( , ) 0B A BF t t =  in equilibrium, it must also hold 
that ( , ) ( , )A BA B A BF t t F t t= . Thus, the Nash equilibrium pair of tax rates must obey: 
 
2 ( ) ( ) 0A A AA B A B A A B B A A
A B A A
dk s dk dk k k t t t t t t k
dt s dt dt
αα α  − − + − + − + − =      (11) 
 
Any parameter combination that does not meet condition (11) can be ruled out as a 
possible equilibrium solution. Investigating condition (11), it is straightforward to see 
that the term 2 Akα−  is negative for any α  greater than zero, which is obviously the 
case for A Bt t> . Additionally, we know from equation (6) that ( )( / )B A A At t d dt kα−  is 
negative in this case. Originating from k  in both jurisdictions, in equilibrium, we 
have capital flows from the high tax jurisdiction A to the low tax jurisdiction B. 
Hence, the term A Bk k−  has also to be negative. On the other hand, given that 
A Bt t> , and bearing in mind equation (8a) the term ( ) ( / )B A A At t dk dtα−  is clearly 
positive. However, as shown in Section A.1 of the appendix, this positive term, is 
more than offset by the negative term A Bk k− . Finally, we have to investigate the 
sign of the last term:  
 
A A
A B
B A
s dkt t
s dt
 −  
            (12) 
 
As all other terms are negative, this term has to be positive to fulfil condition (11). 
In equilibrium, it therefore must hold that: 
 
0B A A Bs t s t− <           (13) 
 
This condition can be fulfilled if, and only if, A Bs s> . Hence, in equilibrium, it is the 
small jurisdiction that levies the lower tax rate and it is the large jurisdiction that 
levies the higher tax rate on capital. This is consistent with the results of Bucovetsky 
(1991), which state, that in the case of tax competition between two jurisdictions of 
different size, and without misreporting activities, the small jurisdiction will levy the 
lower tax rate. Introducing profit shifting will therefore not alter the main result of 
the standard model. This is, of course, not a surprising result: The small jurisdictions 
lower tax rate stems from the fact that, as compared to the large jurisdiction, it faces 
 11
a higher outflow of capital for a given change in its tax rate. As shown by equation 
(8a), although weakened by misreporting activities, this effect is still at work in our 
model. Up to this point of our analysis, we only know that Bt  will be lower than At  
in equilibrium. However, therewith we have not made a statement on how the 
capital-labour ratio, tax rates, and tax revenue will change by introducing 
misreporting activities. This will be addressed in the next chapter.      
 
 
3. Comparative Statics 
 
3.1. Variation of the exogenous profit shifting parameter   
To evaluate the effects of profit shifting on the two jurisdictions we carry out a 
comparative static analysis. This is, we investigate how the variation of the 
exogenous concealment cost parameter β  influences the choice of the two tax rates in 
equilibrium. Following Dixit (1986) the direction of changes of the optimal tax rate of 
jurisdiction i  in response to a variation in β  is then determined by: 
 
. .j i
i
ji i
t const t const
j
dtdt dt dFsign sign
d d dt dβ β β= =
   = +       
  }{, ,i j A B∈ ; i j≠   (14) 
 
where the first term on the right hand side depicts the direct effect of a change in the 
parameter β , while the second term depicts the indirect effect. The direct effect 
determines how a change in the exogenous cost parameter affects the optimal choice 
of jurisdiction i  given that jurisdiction j  does not change its tax rate in response to 
a change in β . The indirect effect determines the response of it  to a change in jt  
that is induced by the change in β .  To determine the sign of equation (14) we first 
have to take a closer look at both the direct and the indirect effects for each 
jurisdiction.    
 
 
3.2. Derivation of direct effects   
To determine the direct effect for the low tax jurisdiction B, we have to implicitly 
differentiate condition (10b) with respect to the exogenous cost parameter β . Using 
equation (8a) and (6) we get: 
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( )
.
12 1
2(1 )( ) 2
A
A B B
B
t const
A B A
A
dk s t
f ddt
dd s s k
f dt
αα β
αβ α α=
 − + − ′′ =
− − −′′
       (15) 
 
with 0d
d
α
β <  from equation (5). 
 
We know that the denominator of equation (15), which is equal to the second order 
condition for the revenue maximizing tax rate of jurisdiction B, will always be 
negative since ( )A Bs sα−  is always positive. Furthermore, since ( )2 1α −Bs  is always 
lower than zero11, the numerator is positive. Therefore we can state that the sign of 
equation (15) is negative. As a result, an increase in the costs for profit shifting, and 
hence less profit shifting activity, will decrease the tax rate of the small jurisdiction 
by the direct effect. Stated differently, an increase in profit shifting activities will lead 
to higher tax rates for the small jurisdiction. At first sight, this result is 
counterintuitive since one may expect that profit shifting will lead to a higher 
mobility of the tax base. Note first, however, that as shown by equation (8a), the 
elasticity of capital decreases since real capital flows are substituted by “paper” flows. 
Second, the tax base of jurisdiction B is increasing in α , since a higher fraction of 
the capital employed in A will be shifted towards jurisdiction B. Although an 
increase in the tax rate of jurisdiction B will diminish α , the net effect will always be 
positive. As a result, the elasticity of the tax base will decrease in α . If this is the 
case, and if misreporting costs decrease, then it is straightforward that the optimal 
reaction of jurisdiction B, assuming that jurisdiction A will not change its policy, is 
to increase its tax rate. This will result in higher tax revenues for the small 
jurisdiction.         
 
We now want to investigate how the variation in the concealment costs will change 
the tax rate for the high tax jurisdiction A, holding the tax rate for jurisdiction B 
constant. Analogous to the case of jurisdiction B, we implicitly differentiate equation 
(10a) and get: 
 
                                                 
11 This follows from equation (1), the equilibrium condition A Bs s>  and 1α < . 
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.
1(1 )(1 )
1(1 )(2 2 ) 2
B
A A B
A
t const
A B A
A A
dk t s
f ddt
d dd t s k
dt f dt
αα β
α αβ α α=
 − − + − − ′′ =
− − − −′′
     (16) 
 
While the numerator is clearly negative, the sign of the denominator can not be 
determined that easy. From equation (6) we know that / 1/ ( , )Ad dt ααα θ α β= . To 
prevent profit shifting ( 0α = ) in the case of different tax rates, ( , )θ α β  and so 
( , )ααθ α β  has to be infinite while it has to be zero to guarantee full profit shifting 
( 1α = ). Now, we can determine the sign of the denominator using (6): For α  close to 
zero, the first term converges to 2 /Bs f ′′ , which is obviously negative, while the 
second term converges to zero. For α  close to one, the first term of the denominator 
disappears while the second, negative, term increases to infinity12. So, with the 
denominator being negative, the sign of equation (16) is positive. This positive sign 
indicates that an exogenous increase in the costs of profit shifting leads to higher 
taxes in the large jurisdiction, if the tax rate of the small jurisdiction remains 
unchanged. Hence, the best response to an increase in the level of profit shifting for 
jurisdiction A is to decrease its tax rate. The effect of profit shifting is thus the 
reverse from the case of the low tax jurisdiction. An exogenous decrease in β  that 
increases α  will make the domestic tax base more elastic. For a given tax rate, this 
will reduce revenues for the high tax jurisdiction. By decreasing its tax rate, the high 
tax jurisdiction will diminish α  so that the negative effect of profit shifting is 
reduced. Accordingly, for a given policy of the low tax jurisdiction, increasing profit 
shifting will reduce tax revenues for the high tax jurisdiction. It thereby induces the 
jurisdiction to lower its tax rate.         
 
 
3.3. Comparative statics in equilibrium 
As can be seen from equation (15) and (16), the two direct effects have opposite 
signs. To determine the general equilibrium effects in equation (14), we next 
determine the indirect effects. This is relegated to Section A.2 of the appendix where 
                                                 
12 Apart from this argumentation, note that the denominator of equation (16) is identical to the second 
order condition for the tax rate of jurisdiction A, which has to be negative to guarantee revenue 
maximization.       
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we show that both reaction functions are upward sloping. Together with the 
condition for the stability of the Nash equilibrium we get: 
 
0 / 1i jdF dt< <            (17) 
 
Hence, we get opposite signs for the direct and indirect effects. Given the complexity 
of equation (14), which depends on the combination of the endogenous parameters 
At , Bt  and α , for which our model can not be solved, we can not determine general 
equilibrium effects. According to (15) and (16) and illustrated by Figure 1, a decrease 
in the exogenous profit shifting cost parameter β , which leads to an increase in 
profit shifting activities, makes the reaction functions of the two tax rates steeper. 
We have to distinguish three possible outcomes of this change in reaction functions.  
 
Possibility 1 (Figure 1a): The direct effect on the large jurisdiction A is rather high 
compared to that for the small jurisdiction B. The equilibrium moves from its initial 
point 0E  to the point 1E . In the new equilibrium both jurisdictions levy lower tax 
rates. In this case, the tax reduction in At  puts strong downward pressure on Bt , and 
thus overcompensates the direct effect in the small jurisdiction B. While the large 
jurisdiction unambiguously loses tax revenue from an increase in profit shifting this is 
not clear for the small jurisdiction. On the one hand, the small jurisdiction still gains 
from the misreporting of capital inputs. On the other hand, it suffers from increased 
tax competition and the resulting lower equilibrium tax rates.  
 
Possibility 2 (Figure 1b): The direct effect dominates for both jurisdictions (i.e. 
/i jdF dt  is small). The equilibrium moves from its initial point 0E  to the point 2E . In 
the new equilibrium the high tax jurisdiction decreases its tax rate while the low tax 
jurisdiction increases its tax rate. While the large jurisdiction unambiguously loses 
tax revenue, the small jurisdiction gains revenue from an increase in profit shifting 
activities. 
 
Possibility 3 (Figure 1c): The direct effect on the small jurisdiction B is rather high 
compared to that for the large jurisdiction A. The equilibrium moves from its initial 
point 0E  to the point 3E . In the new equilibrium both jurisdictions levy higher tax 
rates. In this case, the tax increase in Bt  allows jurisdiction A likewise to increase its 
tax rate. This effect is strong enough to overcompensate the direct effect in the large 
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jurisdiction A. Since the small jurisdiction unambiguously gains from profit shifting, 
there is the possibility that an increase in profit shifting will be beneficial for both 
jurisdictions. Albeit tax revenue of the large jurisdiction is still negatively affected by 
the misreporting of capital inputs, it gains from increased tax rates in equilibrium. 
 
Figure 1  
Equilibrium tax rate changes 
         
   (a)      (b) 
 
   (c) 
 
As a result we can state that profit shifting will not inevitably lead to increased 
pressure on tax rates, as first intuition would suggest. In fact it might also lead to a 
rise in both tax rates. An intermediate, and not implausible, scenario is to assume 
At
( )B At t
( )A Bt t
0E
2E
Bt
At
( )B At t
( )A Bt t
0E
3E
Bt
At
Bt
( )B At t
( )A Bt t
0E
1E
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that the direct effect dominates for both jurisdictions. In this case, a decrease in the 
exogenous cost parameter will lead to convergence in capital tax rates.  
 
 
4. Discussion and possible extensions 
 
Even though profit shifting is thought of as increasing the mobility of tax bases and 
thereby promoting competition between jurisdictions, we have shown that it will not 
inevitably result in a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates. Quite the reverse, 
profit shifting may also lead to convergence in tax rates which counteracts the effects 
of differences in size or it may even lead to an uncoordinated increase in tax rates. 
Furthermore, not considering general equilibrium effects, the high tax jurisdiction will 
be worse off while the low tax jurisdiction gains from profit shifting. This is an 
important issue concerning the question whether both jurisdictions may agree to 
coordinate tax rates. As Wilson (1991) has shown, in the absence of profit shifting, it 
may be possible that potential gains from competition are comparatively large for the 
small jurisdiction. Eggert and Haufler (1998) analyse the conditions for which this is 
the case. They show that potential gains are generally, and often strongly, reduced 
when real-world features such as imperfect mobility are considered. From their 
results, they conclude that only a few and very small jurisdictions can benefit from 
tax competition and that an agreement to coordinate tax rates may be possible. Our 
analysis in the previous section has shown that if profit shifting is introduced into 
this model, the small jurisdiction has some extra gains which make it more likely that 
it can benefit from competition. Therefore, any attempt to coordinate capital taxes 
will be even more difficult than has been anticipated in the earlier literature.   
 
Our results may also be relevant in light of the current debate on a harmonization of 
tax bases among the EU (see European Commission, 2001). A switch from separate 
accounting to a consolidated tax base will, in any case, increase the costs of profit 
shifting. For our model, this means to increase β  and thereby to decrease α . If 
direct effects dominate in general equilibrium, then the implementation of the 
Commission’s proposal will lead to more divergence in tax rates. If the indirect effect 
dominates for the large jurisdiction, then a switch away from separate accounting will 
even result in increased tax competition. A similar effect has been derived by Keen 
(2001) for the related problem of preferential taxation: Given that competition 
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through profit shifting is restricted, jurisdictions revert to traditional tax competition, 
using their remaining instrument, the tax rate more aggressively.        
 
Furthermore, our model may explain the inconclusive results of a number of 
empirical studies measuring how globalization influences national tax rates and 
revenues (see e.g. Garrett, 1995, Swank, 2001). Given our results, if increased profit 
shifting is the outcome of globalisation, then it will be hard to answer the question 
whether globalisation leads to more or less pressure on tax systems, simply by 
studying the relation between (an index for) globalisation and capital tax rates. 
Empirical work concentrating on the relation between globalisation and revenues may 
meet similar problems. Here, it is a crucial point that the existence of profit shifting 
may generate extra revenue for low (and in some cases even for high) tax regions.  
 
The results obtained above rely on a number of simplifying assumptions. One 
important assumption was the independence of the firm’s investment and 
misreporting decisions (see equation (3)), which implies that increasing investment in 
one jurisdiction has no effect on the overall concealment costs. Instead, it may be 
argued that misreporting becomes less costly the more capital is employed in a 
jurisdiction since it is then easier to conceal this activity from tax authorities13. A 
very simple way to incorporate this interdependence in our model would be to make 
the concealment costs dependent on Ak  or Bk
14. As briefly discussed in footnote 7, 
this would introduce another distortion into our model since any additional 
investment in jurisdiction A or B will then represent an investment in tax avoidance. 
However, this extension of the basic model will not change our qualitative results. 
For example, let us assume that concealment costs decrease with Ak
15. In this case, 
profit shifting still has a negative effect on jurisdiction A (compared to a world where 
there is no profit shifting at all) but the additional investment in tax avoidance 
reduces this negative effect. As a result, jurisdiction A will still reduce its tax rate in 
                                                 
13 For example, Grubert and Slemrod (1998) assume that the presence of intangible assets decreases 
the costs for profit shifting. 
14 If we use 2( , ) Akθ α β  as total costs for profit shifting, we are in a situation in which the optimal level 
of profits shifted negatively depends on Ak . An alternative, in which concealment costs decrease with 
the amount of capital employed in the low tax jurisdiction, is presented by Stöwhase (2003). Note that 
this type of modelling corresponds to the implementation of a “thin-capitalization rule”.    
15 For the case where concealment costs decrease with investment in jurisdiction B, the argumentation 
is very similar.  
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order to minimize profit shifting, but the reduction will be smaller than in the basic 
model. For jurisdiction B, the positive effect of profit shifting will be smaller than in 
the basic model since the additional investment in A implies lower investment in 
jurisdiction B. 
 
Another interesting point would be to consider the effect of profit shifting on labour 
income (the fixed factor). As shown by Mintz and Smart (2004) and confirmed by 
our study, profit shifting makes the allocation of real capital less responsive to tax 
rate differences. For a given tax differential, this implies that, whenever profit 
shifting increases, the large jurisdiction will gain some capital at the expense of the 
small jurisdiction. This will also alter the return of the complementary factor, labour. 
Since governments simply maximize their capital tax revenue in our model, they do 
not consider these effects when setting tax rates16. In reality, however, we observe an 
increasing policy interest in attracting physical investment in order to fight 
unemployment. This aspect can be incorporated by extending the government’s 
revenue function such that revenue consists of two components, revenue from capital 
taxes and revenue from labour taxes. We then have two counteracting effects of 
profit shifting, one affecting the capital tax base and an additional one affecting the 
labour tax base. Depending on the size of the additional effect, our results from above 
may be weakened or even turned around. For instance, one may think about a 
situation in which most revenue of the large jurisdiction stems from the taxation of 
labour income. An increase in profit shifting activities will then reduce the capital tax 
base and enlarge the labour tax base. If the overall effect is revenue increasing, the 
large jurisdiction effectively gains from profit shifting and hence has an incentive to 
raise its capital tax rate in order to further increase profit shifting.      
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 An interesting paper dealing with the effects of profit shifting on real investment is Peralta, Wauthy 
and van Ypersele (2003). In their model, the location of a firm yields positive externalities for the host 
country. This is related to the potential positive effects on labour income described here. They show 
that the positive externality of real investment may overcompensate for the loss of capital tax revenue 
in the high tax jurisdiction.  
 19
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have extended the literature on tax competition between countries 
of unequal size (Bucovetsky, 1991) by giving multinational firms the possibility to 
engage in costly cross-border profit shifting activities. For revenue maximizing 
governments that have only one tax instrument, we have shown that it is the smaller 
of two otherwise identical jurisdictions that levies the lower tax rate in equilibrium. 
 
We then studied how a change in profit shifting costs affects equilibrium tax rates. 
The direct effect of a reduction in the costs for profit shifting is to decrease the tax-
base elasticity of the small jurisdiction and to increase the elasticity of the large 
jurisdiction. If indirect effects, caused by the response of each jurisdiction’s tax rate 
to the tax change in the competing jurisdiction, are not too large, then we get 
convergence in tax rates. In general, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the indirect effect dominates the direct effect in either the small or the large 
jurisdiction. If this is the case, profit shifting may either lead to a “race to the 
bottom” or to a “race to the top” with respect to the rates of capital taxation.   
 
This result has some important policy implications. If profit shifting induces the small 
jurisdiction to increase and the large jurisdiction to decrease its tax rate, then any 
attempt to reduce profit shifting will lead to more divergence in tax rates. Quite 
counterintuitive, the prevention of profit shifting may even lead to increased tax 
competition in some cases. Policymakers should be aware of this possibility when 
discussing the implementation of a consolidated tax base for the European Union. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1. Determining the sign of distinct terms in equation (11) 
Using equations (2), (7) and (1), as well as (8a), we get: 
 
[ ] 1( )(1 ) ( , ) 0A B A Bk k t t fα θ α β− = − − − <′′       (A.1.1) 
 
2 1( ) ( )( )AB A A B B
A
dkt t t t s
dt f
α α α − = − − −  ′′       (A.1.2) 
 
Summing up (A.1.1) and (A.1.2), we get: 
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2 1( )(1 ) ( , )A B B Bt t s s f
α α α θ α β − − − + −  ′′       (A.1.3) 
 
which is negative for any α  below one and gets zero for 1α = . 
 
 
A.2. Derivation of equation (17) 
Implicitly differentiating condition (10b) with respect to the tax rate of jurisdiction 
A, we get for the low tax jurisdiction: 
 
1(1 )( 1) (3 1)
2(1 )( ) 2
B B B B B AB
A A
A
A B A
A
d ds s s s t k
dt f dtdF
ddt s s k
f dt
α αα α α
αα α
  − − + − + − − +   ′′  =
− − −′′
    (A.2.1) 
 
which is obviously positive, since both, the numerator as well as the denominator are 
negative. 
 
Implicitly differentiating condition (10a) with respect to the tax rate of jurisdiction 
B, we get for the high tax jurisdiction: 
 
1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1(1 )(2 2 ) 2
A A A AA
A A
B
A B A
A A
d dt s s k
dt f dtdF
d ddt t s k
dt f dt
α αα α
α αα α
  − − − − − +   ′′  =
− − − −′′
    (A.2.2) 
 
Again, the numerator is negative. Since we know from equation (16) that the 
denominator is also negative, equation (A.2.2) is positive. 
